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Of Oatmeal, Bears, and NPEs: Ensuring Fair, Effective, and Affordable
Copyright Enforcement Through Copyright Insurance
by Evan McAlpine1
Abstract

1

Increasing copyright infringement and
high litigation costs have left many independent
content producers without the means to effectively
commercialize their creations. However, this problem
can be solved with inspiration from the patent world,
where non-practicing entities (NPEs) have, among
other things, given independent inventors additional
options for commercializing their inventions. If
adopted by the copyright world, an NPE would
also provide more enforcement options to creators
of copyrighted material, but would best do so by
selling copyright insurance. This would allow it
to legally pursue infringers on behalf of its insured
clients, and give clients maximum control over their
content. This system will eliminate rampant copyright
infringement while simultaneously opening new
markets for insurance providers, increasing the value of
copyrighted works, and making copyright enforcement
more efficient.
Introduction
Matthew Inman runs an online cartoon called
“The Oatmeal.”2 His business model is simple: he
draws cartoons and monetizes them via merchandising
and ad revenue.3 In early 2010, though, Inman learned
that a content aggregator,4 funnyjunk.com, was
displaying hundreds of copies of his work,5 without
1. Candidate, M.S., Intellectual Property Management and
Markets at the Illinois Institute of Technology. Thanks to Professor
Edward Lee, Professor David Schwartz, and Grant Schakelford
for their teaching, guidance, and coaching throughout the writing
process. Thanks also to my brother, Bob McAlpine, for providing
the inspiration for this article.
2. Matthew Inman, About the Oatmeal, The Oatmeal, http://
theoatmeal.com/pages/about (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
3. Danny Bradbury, The Oatmeal beat Funnyjunk, but other
cartoonists aren’t so lucky, Guardian (June 21, 2012, 1:55 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jun/21/oatmealcarreon-comics-property.
4. A content aggregator is a website that does not produce any
content, but rather assembles content from other sources into one
place.
5. Matthew Inman, What should I do about FunnyJunk.com,
The Oatmeal, http://theoatmeal.com/blog/funnyjunk (last visited
Feb. 21, 2013).

link-backs or attribution. Accordingly, he requested the
site’s administrator remove the infringing copies via a
DMCA takedown notice.6
After fruitlessly sending these requests
for a year,7 Inman grew frustrated with the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) process, and
resorted to the power of the press to protect his
intellectual property.8 He wrote two blog-posts on his
website9 ranting about his stolen comics, and then let
the issue rest.10 One year later, though, he received a
letter from FunnyJunk’s attorney, demanding him to
remove his posts about FunnyJunk and to pay twentythousand dollars for alleged defamation and false
advertising.11 In the following weeks, Inman retaliated
with more blog posts and then raised more than ten
times the requested amount, which he donated to
charity to spite FunnyJunk.12 He also sent FunnyJunk’s
attorney a drawing of his mother attempting to seduce
a bear, along with several pictures of the charity
money.13 FunnyJunk then sued Inman for trademark
infringement and inciting others to cyber-vandalism.14
After some brief legal foot-stepping, FunnyJunk
ultimately honored Inman’s original request by
blocking its users from accessing his content and it then
dismissed its lawsuit.15
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Dan Mitchell, Bear Seduction and the Copyright
Conundrum, SFWeekly Blogs (June 12, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://
blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2012/06/bear_seduction_and_the_
copyrig.php.
12. Matthew Inman, FunnyJunk is threatening to file a federal
lawsuit against me unless I pay $20,000 in damages, The Oatmeal,
http://theoatmeal.com/blog/funnyjunk_letter (last visited Feb. 21,
2012).
13. Matthew Inman, As promised, here’s the photo of
$211,223.04 in cash we raised for charity, The Oatmeal, http://
theoatmeal.com/blog/charity_money (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
14. Complaint at 1, Carreon v. Inman, No. 12-CV-03112 (N.D.
Cal., June 15, 2012).
15. Michael Cavna, ‘The Oatmeal’ v. FunnyJunk Lawyer: Why
Charles Carreon dropped his Indiegogo charity lawsuit, Wash.
Post Blog (July 6, 2012, 12:43 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/comic-riffs/post/the-oatmeal-v-funnyjunk-lawyer-whycharles-carreon-dropped-his-indiegogo-charity-lawsuit/2012/07/06/
gJQAND0pQW_blog.html.
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While few could have predicted that a simple
copyright dispute would escalate to such comical
proportions, the story nonetheless illustrates a
salient issue in modern copyright enforcement. The
Internet allows individuals to engage in mass copying
and redistribution with only a few mouse-clicks,
while owners of copyright-protected material lack
comparable countermeasures. For example, copyright
owners bear the burden of identifying and policing
infringers,16 but most are unable to afford the cost of
enforcing their rights against these copiers.17 Under the
current system, a mass infringer operates at little cost,
while the copyright owner must spend a substantial
sum to protect his rights.18 While copyright protection
may be considered just another cost of doing business
for large organizations such as Disney or Universal,
the expense of litigation is often an insurmountable
obstacle to an individual whose rights have been
violated.19
A similar situation exists in patent law.
There, while the cost of enforcement remains high, a
solution has evolved that allows patent owners to more
efficiently and effectively protect their property. The
non-practicing entity (NPE) is an organization that does
not seek to sell patented products, but rather specializes
in licensing and enforcing patents.20 Accordingly,
they have dramatically changed the landscape of
patent law, albeit with a great deal of controversy, by
providing independent inventors with an additional
source of capital, and with cheaper and more effective
enforcement options.21
With only minor changes, the copyright world
could adopt a similar model, whereby owners rely on
third-parties to enforce their intellectual property rights.
These copyright-based NPEs would fill a growing void
by providing copyright owners with an effective and
affordable mechanism for protecting their property, and
in the process give owners the ability to realize more
value from their property and more ways to protect it.
This Note proposes using NPEs in copyright
law to solve the problem of mass online copyright
infringement. Part I begins with an overview of
copyright infringement both before and after the
16. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
17. Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intell. Prop., of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 45–46 (2006) [Copyright
Claims Hearing] (statement of the United States Copyright Office).
18. Id. at 45–47.
19. Id.
20. See infra section I.C.
21. Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths Exposed, Intell. Asset
Mgmt. Mag., July/Aug. 2012, at 74.
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Internet became the primary method of content
distribution, and highlights the changes in business
structure that have altered the copyright enforcement
paradigm. It next discusses Righthaven’s failed
attempt to become a copyright NPE and the lessons
that potential followers can learn from that company’s
experiment. Finally, the section ends with an analysis
of the impact of NPEs on patent law, and notes that
copyright law could benefit from the alternative
enforcement mechanisms these organizations provide.
In Part II, this Note proposes introducing NPEs
into the copyright world in order to achieve more
affordable and effective copyright enforcement. This
section explains that, unlike patent NPEs that own their
intellectual property outright, a copyright NPE will be
most effective by insuring the copyrights of others and
using the doctrine of subrogation to enforce its client’s
rights against infringers. It then explains the basic
mechanics of how such an organization would work,
and then discusses the benefits that these organizations
would give to society.
Part III addresses the potential criticisms
of this proposal. Specifically, it explains how the
fair use doctrine will not prevent copyright insurers
from operating profitably. It also addresses concerns
that copyright insurers will use their power to bully
infringers into unfair settlements. Finally, it explains
how copyright insurers will not adversely affect fair
users or free speech.
I.
Copyright Owners Need New 			
	Enforcement Mechanisms
Over the past several decades, advances in
technology have given copyright owners new and
powerful ways to monetize their creations.22 The
Internet and, specifically, social networks allow owners
to distribute their works to increasingly larger markets
and to exercise greater control over how their property
is used. However, the Internet also allows individuals
to copy, redistribute, and pirate on a massive scale
and in ways that the law cannot yet effectively
control.23 Accordingly, copyright owners cannot rely

22. Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online:
The Art Act, The Net Act and Illegal Streaming: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition, and the Internet H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 16 (Mar. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Subcomm. Hearing] (statement of Maria A. Pallante,
Register of Copyrights).
23. The “Stop Online Piracy Act”: Hearing on H.R. 3261
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (Nov. 16,
2011) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights).
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on traditional copyright enforcement mechanisms.24
Rather, they need new tools to protect their property
against the new threats of the online world.
A.

The Problem of Copyright
Infringement

In recent Congressional testimony, Maria
Pallante, the Register of Copyrights, articulated the
problem of mass copyright infringement, saying:
[W]hen
infringers
blatantly
distribute, stream, and otherwise
disseminate copyrighted works
on the Internet, they often do so
because they have no expectation
of enforcement.
Unfortunately,
the more these kinds of actions go
unchecked, the less appealing the
Internet will be for creators of and
investors in legitimate content. In
other words, Internet piracy not
only usurps the copyright value
chain for any one work, it also
threatens the rule of copyright law
in the 21st century.25
Unlike in the pre-Internet world, today anyone with
a computer can create and distribute content, and
anyone with a computer can infringe and pirate
content. Because the Internet has so fundamentally
altered the way individuals create, distribute, and
consume content,26 the law protecting that content must
fundamentally change as well. As Ms. Pallante noted,
without a change to provide adequate enforcement
mechanisms, many creators will simply stop creating.27
1.

Traditional Copyright Enforcement
Mechanisms

Before home recording technology became
widely available in the 1990s, most content
was created, produced, and distributed by large
organizations. For example, to professionally
produce a music album, a record company must pay
for recording, editing, marketing, and distributing.28
Id.
Id. at 2.
Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 16.
Id. at 2.
Record Industry Association of America, Let’s Play: The
American Music Business 6 (2010).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Because trained professionals perform these functions,
and because the final product shipped to market
is a tangible good, the costs are incredibly high.29
Accordingly, large-scale content production was an
enterprise in which only large organizations could
operate.
Further, the enforcement system envisioned by
copyright law was appropriate for such organizations.
Because the law allows a copyright owner to sue when
her work is infringed, simple business sense dictates
that the work in question must be at least be as valuable
as the cost of the litigation to protect it,30 or that the
owner must have a sufficiently good chance of winning
the suit and recouping his costs.31 Further, the high cost
of bringing creative works to market would require the
work to be at least as valuable as the cost of creating
and distributing it.32 Combined with the fact that these
works were commercialized by large organizations, the
ability to use the court system to protect a copyright
was an appropriate enforcement mechanism. Large
organizations were willing to incur the expense of
protecting their works through litigation because they
only invested in a product that was worth at least the
cost of commercialization and defense.
While traditional litigation was an adequate
remedy for large organizations, the fair use doctrine33
provided a mechanism for individuals and smaller
entities to use copyrighted material without fear of
legal retribution by the larger and more powerful
organizations. Under traditional enforcement
models, this doctrine worked well because it helped
normalize the unequal power relationship between
large and small entities. Further, the doctrine tacitly
recognized that, because of the massive differences
between the large organization and individual copier,
the individual’s copying was unlikely to cause harm
to the organization’s product. Indeed, when content
29. Id. at 3, 6.
30. No rational person would spend $30,000 to protect a
copyright only worth $20,000.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006).
32. A business would not sell a product for ten dollars if it cost
them fifteen dollars to produce it.
33. The fair use doctrine allows unauthorized use of
copyrighted materials under certain conditions. 17 U.S.C. §
107 (2006) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.”).
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production was a capital-intensive industry, logic
dictated that only a well-funded entity could cause
significant damage through infringement.
2.

The Internet and Mass Copyright
Infringement

While copyright enforcement mechanisms
were effective in the world of the 1976 Copyright Act,
the Internet has fundamentally altered the business
of content production.34 Unlike the example in the
previous section, producing and distributing a music
album today requires only a microphone, basic
recording software, and an Internet connection. The
world of content production is no longer capitalintensive and dominated by large entities.35 Rather,
organizations such as the New York Times and NBC
operate on a distribution model similar to that of the
average blogger: they post content to their websites
and rely on advertising revenue to make a profit.36
Accordingly, content is cheaper to produce and cheaper
to infringe. The result is that more individuals are
producing and distributing their own content, but
do not have effective or affordable tools to fight
infringement.37
While online content distribution is
extremely cheap, protecting that content is impossibly
expensive.38 First, copyright owners bear the burden
of policing their own work.39 When they find
unauthorized copying online, they must ask the website
administrator to remove the offending material, and the
owner can only sue for infringement if the work is not
removed “expeditiously.”40 When the work is widely
copied, this process can become incredibly timeconsuming and lead to high opportunity costs. In the
words of Matthew Inman, “trying to police copyright
infringement on the Internet is like strolling into the
Vietnamese jungle circa 1964 and politely asking
34. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 16.
35. Justin Bachman, The Big Record Labels’ Not-So-Big
Future, Bus. Wk. (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.businessweek.
com/stories/2007-10-10/the-big-record-labels-not-so-bigfuturebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financialadvice.
36. Eriq Gardner, The Righthaven Experiment: A Journalist
Wonders if the Copyright Troll Who Sued Him was Somehow . . .
Right?, A.B.A. J., May 2012, at 36.
37. See Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic
Survey 2011, at 35 (stating the median cost of copyright litigation
for disputes with less than $1,000,000 at risk was $200,000 in
2011).
38. Id.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2006).
40. Id.
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everyone to use squirt guns.”41 Second, most content
creators today do not have the resources to protect their
property through litigation.42 Even if they did, few
copyright owners would be willing to spend thousands
of dollars in court costs and attorney’s fees to recover
only a fraction of their costs in a damage award. The
result is that many copyright owners have been “left . .
. to compete with thieves.”43
Indeed, most infringers know that they are
unlikely to face the consequences of their actions
because enforcement is too expensive. Because there
is rarely a credible threat of litigation, and because
infringing costs even less than creating, they are able to
make a profit at the expense of content producers.44 For
example, infringers use unauthorized works to generate
ad revenue on their sites.45 They simultaneously divert
traffic from the work’s original source, which decreases
the owner’s ad revenue.46 Accordingly, a content
producer may invest substantial energy in distributing
his work online, only to be left remediless against the
destructive effects of a few mouse-clicks. The infringer
contributes nothing new to society and prospers at the
producer’s expense, who, because of mass copyright
infringement, has increasingly fewer incentives to
invest resources into creating new works.
B.

Copyright Enforcement and
Righthaven

Recognizing the problem of mass online
copyright infringement, a company called Righthaven
began a doomed attempt at third-party copyright
enforcement in 2010.47 It was built on a simple model:
acquire limited rights to copyrighted material and then
aggressively pursue infringers.48 While its experiment
ultimately ended in failure, the lessons learned were
not in vain. Despite some legal technicalities that
ultimately proved to be fatal, Righthaven demonstrated
that a third-party copyright enforcement entity has the
potential to be effective, profitable, and beneficial to its
clients.

41. Inman, supra note 5.
42. See Copyright Claims Hearing, supra note 17.
43. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Steve Green, Legal attack dog sicked on websites accused
of violating R-J copyrights, Las Vegas Sun (Aug. 4, 2010, 2:00
AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/aug/04/unlikelytargets-emerging-war-media-content/.
48. Id.
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1.

Righthaven’s Business Model

Righthaven sought to provide copyright
enforcement services to content producers, specifically
newspaper publishers.49 It entered into agreements
with several media companies in which it acquired
limited rights to their copyright portfolios in return for
a share in the proceeds of any litigation it won based on
those copyrights.50 These agreements gave Righthaven
“all copyrights requisite to have Righthaven recognized
as the copyright owner of the work for purposes of
Righthaven being able to claim ownership,”51 and
limited Righthaven’s ability to exploit the copyrights to
merely suing for infringement.52 Further, Righthaven
was obligated to reassign its interest in the copyrights
to their owners if it did not pursue litigation within a
specified time period.53
Once Righthaven acquired these rights, it
identified infringers, who were always individuals
or small organizations, and demanded them to pay a
settlement fee or face litigation.54 It used aggressive
tactics and the threat of costly litigation to induce most
to quickly negotiate and pay the settlement fee.55 When
an infringer refused to negotiate a payment and opted
to defend its activity in court, Righthaven asked for
the defendant’s domain name to be forfeited as part of
the judgment.56 In short, Righthaven’s strategy was
to use its legal muscle to quickly and cheaply secure
settlement payments from parties that lacked resources
to defend themselves, and to spend time and money in
court only when absolutely necessary.
2.

Why Righthaven Failed

Despite its aggressive tactics, Righthaven
went defunct less than two years after it was founded.57
Because many of the people it sued were sympathetic
49. Gardner, supra note 36, at 37.
50. Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1142
(D. Nev. 2011).
51. Id. at 1143.
52. Id. at 1142.
53. Id. at 1145.
54. Green, supra note 47.
55. Steve Green, About Righthaven, Vegas Inc (Nov. 29,
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2010/nov/29/
about-righthaven.
56. Steve Green, Judge Strikes Righthaven Website Domain
Demand, Vegas Inc (Apr. 16, 2011, 2:05 AM), http://www.
vegasinc.com/news/2011/apr/16/judge-strikes-righthaven-websitedomain-demand.
57. Steve Green, Righthaven Receiver Moves to Fire CEO
Steven Gibson, Law Vegas Sun (June 25, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://
www.vegasinc.com/news/2012/jun/25/righthaven-receiver-movesfire-ceo-steven-gibson.

defendants and protected by the fair use doctrine,58
and because the courts determined that it did not have
standing to sue for copyright infringement, Righthaven
lost every case it litigated.59 Accordingly, the
company’s assets were turned over to a court-appointed
receiver, and its founder is now under investigation by
the Nevada State Bar.60
First, Righthaven’s business model was
flawed because it only sought to enforce copyrights
against infringers who were likely to give in to
settlement demands.61 Because individuals and small
organizations typically do not have the resources or
desire to fight lengthy court battles, Righthaven was
able to use the specter of litigation to strong-arm these
parties into modest settlement agreements.62 However,
while this strategy may have looked good on paper; it
backfired in practice. While most infringers quickly
settled, some did not. In those cases that were heard
in court, judges ruled in favor of the defendants.63
Furthermore, as some defendants increasingly won
cases against Righthaven, others became less likely to
settle infringement claims, and more likely to litigate.
Consequently, Righthaven spent more money in court
than it was prepared to and cquired a reputation as
a copyright “troll” out to make easy money at the
expense of defenseless individuals, both in and out of
court. Accordingly, courts grew less sympathetic to
Righthaven’s complaints and more favorable towards
the defendants.
Second, Righthaven’s business model was
flawed because it failed to identify which infringers
were protected by the fair use doctrine and which
were not. In many of these cases, the court found
that although the defendants had engaged in unlawful
copying, their use of the material was a fair use and
therefore not an infringement.64 For example, in
58. Id.
59. See generally Comprehensive List of Copyright
Infringement Lawsuits Filed by Righthaven, LLC, Righthaven
Lawsuits (last visited Apr. 20, 2013), http://righthavenlawsuits.
com/lawsuits.html (listing of every Righthaven lawsuit and its
disposition).
60. Steve Green, Three Attorneys Face Righthaven Inquiry
by State Bar, Vegas Inc (Jan. 12, 2012, 7:52 PM), http://www.
vegasinc.com/news/2012/jan/12/three-attorneys-face-righthaveninquiry-state-bar.
61. Green, supra note 47.
62. Id.
63. Steve Green, Righthaven Ordered to Pay Attorney’s Fees
in Another Case, Vegas Inc (June 14, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.
vegasinc.com/news/2012/jun/14/righthaven-ordered-pay-attorneysfees-another-case.
64. See Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Group, No. 2:10-CV1036 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010); Righthaven LLC v. Klerks, No. 2:10CV-00741 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2010).
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Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn,65 the court found that
although the defendant had copied and re-posted an
entire copyrighted newspaper article, his use was a
fair use.66 Righthaven lost money in litigation and in
settlement potential because it was unable to determine
which infringers were fair users.67 Furthermore,
because Righthaven sued many fair use defendants, its
image suffered even more, and in addition to pursuing
ill-equipped defendants, it also harassed individuals for
their legitimate use of copyrighted material.68
Third, and finally, the most serious flaw
with Righthaven’s business model was that the
company never acquired standing to sue for copyright
infringement.69 Federal statute dictates that the legal
or beneficial owner of one of the six exclusive rights
under a copyright the right to sue for infringement.
As interpreted by the courts, this provision requires a
plaintiff to own one of the exclusive rights enumerated
in the Copyright Act.70 For example, in Silvers v. Sony
Pictures Entertainment, Inc.,71 the court found that
the plaintiff did not have standing to sue for copyright
infringement because she had only acquired the bare
right to sue for infringement.72
When Righthaven acquired an interest in
Stephens Media’s copyright portfolio, it gained “all
copyrights requisite to have Righthaven recognized
as the copyright owner of the Work for purposes of
Righthaven being able to claim ownership as well as
the right to seek redress for past, present and future
65. 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. 2011).
66. Id. at 1150.
67. Green, supra note 63.
68. Nate Anderson, Class-action lawsuit targets Righthaven’s
“extortion litigation”, Ars Technica (May 18, 2011, 12:57 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/05/class-action-lawsuittargets-righthavens-extortion-litigation.
69. Righthaven, LLC v. Democratic Underground, 791 F.
Supp. 2d 968, 976 (D. Nev. 2011).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (“[T]he owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any
of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies
or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords
of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer
of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of
literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.”).
71. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th
Cir. 2005).
72. Id.

24

infringements of the copyright, both accrued and unaccrued, in and to the Work.”73 The court found that
this agreement did not give Righthaven ownership
over any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, and
Righthaven therefore did not have standing to bring
the suit.74 Accordingly, all of the 276 cases Righthaven
brought were dismissed, and Righthaven was often
ordered to pay the defendant’s litigation costs.75
Furthermore, after Righthaven accrued over
$300,000.00 in attorney’s fees owed to its opponents,76
a federal judge ordered all of the company’s tangible
and intangible assets delivered to a court-appointed
receiver, which was sold to satisfy its debts.77 Although
the company still has two cases pending in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, it is essentially defunct.78
Righthaven’s attempt to provide an alternate copyright
enforcement mechanism was a colossal failure.
However, this failure is a valuable lesson for future
attempts at alternative enforcement: a third-party
copyright enforcer must overcome the hurdles of fair
use and standing in order to be effective and profitable.
C.

Lessons in Third-Party Enforcement
from Patent Law

In patent law, organizations known as NPEs
operate on a business model similar to Righthaven’s.
However, unlike Righthaven, NPEs have been
enormously successful and have had a profound
effect on the landscape of patent law.79 In addition to
acquiring rights to patents and then suing infringers,
they seek to build revenue streams by licensing their
patents to others.80 Accordingly, NPEs in patent law
have provided an effective and affordable solution to
the problem of expensive litigation. Due to the many
similarities between patent law and copyright law, it
seems appropriate to look to these entities for answers
to the problem of inaccessible copyright enforcement.

73. Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (D.
Nev. 2011).
74. Id.
75. See Righthaven LLC v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273
(D. Nev. 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Eiser, No. 2:10-CV-3075,
(D.S.C. Jan. 13, 2012).
76. Green, supra note 63.
77. Steve Green, Judge Strips Righthaven of Rights to 278
Copyrights and its Trademark, Vegas Inc (Mar. 5, 2012, 7:29
PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2012/mar/05/judge-stripsrighthaven-rights-278-copyrights-and-/.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Joff Wild, A War by Any Other Name, Intell. Asset
Mgmt., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 4.
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1.

The Structure of a Non-Practicing
Entity in Patent Law

Large NPEs operate on one of two models.
Organizations such as Acacia Technologies work
by acquiring patents, licensing the use rights to
those patents, and suing infringers.81 Conversely,
organizations such as RPX Corporation are known as
defensive patent aggregators (DPAs).82 These NPEs
work by building patent portfolios and licensing
them for defensive use, essentially providing risk
management services via a pool of patents that its
clients may use to defend themselves from litigation.83
Under the first model, NPEs provide a
clearing-house function: they identify valuable patents,
acquire them, and then assert them through licensing
negotiations or litigation. Companies use these types
of NPEs as a cheap alternative to in-house research and
development: the NPE has already located and acquired
the needed technology and is usually able to provide
it for less than the cost of research and development.
Once a license is agreed upon, the company is able
to start producing its product immediately. This
arrangement is similar to a common cross-licensing
deal,84 except that it is one-sided, which makes the
whole process more efficient.
Under the second model, NPEs provide risk
management services in the form of patent protection.
Here, an NPE aggregates a large pool of patents that
its clients can use to defend against infringement
suits. Although some commentators, and even some
DPAs, claim that this business model provides strategic
defense against “trolling” behavior, Jiaqing Lu points
out that both models are necessary in today’s patent
ecosystem.85 Under his theory, both varieties of NPEs
81. Profile, Acacia, http://acaciatechnologies.com/
aboutus_main.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (“Acacia Research
Corporation’s subsidiaries partner with inventors and patent owners,
license the patents to corporate users, and share the revenue. Our
partners are primarily individual inventors and small companies
with limited resources to deal with unauthorized users but include
some large companies wanting to generate revenues from their
patented technologies.”).
82. RPX, http://www.rpxcorp.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2013)
(“Every member of our client network receives a license to every
patent and patent right we own.”).
83. Id. (“RPX helps corporations manage their exposure to
patent risk by providing a rational alternative to traditional litigation
strategy. Our solution offers a market-based solution in which we
proactively acquire high-risk patents before they can become a
costly legal problem for our clients.”).
84. Black’s Law Dictionary 1003 (9th ed. 2009) (“An
agreement between two or more patentees to exchange licenses for
their mutual benefit and use of the licensed product.”).
85. Jiaqing Lu, The Economics and Controversies of
Nonpracticing Entities (NPEs): How NPEs and Defensive Patent

complement each other by providing unique services to
the market.
2.

The Judicial Response to Nonpracticing Entities

Although U.S. courts have yet to address
whether patent law should treat NPEs differently
than other patent users, several courts have heard
infringement cases in which NPEs have been principle
players. For example, in eBay v. MercExchange,
LLC,86 the Supreme Court considered whether an
injunction should automatically issue against a party
liable of patent infringement.87 Writing for the Court,
Justice Thomas rejected the appellate court’s view that
a party’s “‘lack of commercial activity in practicing
the patents’ would be sufficient to establish that the
patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if
an injunction did not issue.”88 He noted instead that
“some patent holders, such as university researchers
or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to
license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to
secure the financing necessary to bring their works to
market themselves.”89 However, Justice Kennedy, in a
concurring opinion, argued that a court should consider
“the economic function of the patent holder.” Justice
Kennedy noted that for NPEs, “an injunction, and the
potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation,
can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses
to practice the patent.”90
Further, in z4 Technologies v. Microsoft,91 the
district court for the Eastern District of Texas denied
z4’s request to enjoin Microsoft’s infringing use of
its software patent.92 In this case, z4 argued that it
had made a significant effort to commercialize its
patents, and that Microsoft’s continuing infringement
would limit its ability to sell its product.93 Because
Microsoft and z4 were not direct competitors, the court
found that z4 would not be irreparably harmed by the
infringement, and that monetary damages were an

Aggregators will Change the License Market, Part II, 48 Les
Nouvelles 147, 151 (2012).
86. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 393 (quoting Mercexchange, L.L.C., v. eBay, Inc.,
275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
91. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
92. Id. at 438.
93. Id. at 440.
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adequate award.94 Essentially, it said that Microsoft’s
use would not dissuade others from purchasing z4’s
software because it only used the software in its own
products. However, the court overlooked the harm that
Microsoft’s continuing use would inflict on z4’s ability
to license its software.
For NPEs, the implications of this decision
are dire: if a judge can deny an injunction in part
because the parties are not competitors, NPEs will
always operate at a disadvantage. Because infringers
will be less likely to be enjoined when sued by an
NPE rather than by a direct competitor, they will be
more likely to litigate claims brought by NPEs, and
NPEs will accordingly have to accept lower licensing
fees. Although the law has yet to speak directly to the
issues presented by NPEs, it seems far from reaching a
consensus.
3.

The Impact of Non-Practicing Entities
in Patent Law

As seen in eBay v. MercExchange, NPEs have
both friends and enemies.95 Supporters argue that
NPEs benefit the patent system by lowering transaction
costs, which makes the patent market more efficient,96
giving individual inventors a more efficient way to
enforce their rights,97 and providing an additional
source of capital to individual inventors and startup
companies.98 However, their opponents argue that
NPEs are ruining the patent system because they use
low-value patents to extort large licensing fees from
productive companies,99 try to maximize their profits by
waiting for an industry to develop before asserting their
patents,100 and freeload off of the patent system without
contributing anything in return.101
However, a recent empirical study by Michael
Risch shows that most of these arguments have no
factual support. In fact, his data revealed that NPEs
have had a significant impact on patent law in only two
ways: they help individual inventors enforce claims
94. Id. at 444.
95. See Damian Myers, Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was eBay
v. MercExchange Enough?, 14 J. Intell. Prop. L. 333 (2007);
Sannu Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 114 (2010).
96. James McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea
Economy, 56 Emory L. J. 189, 211 (2006).
97. Risch, supra note 21, at 74.
98. Shrestha, supra note 95, at 150.
99. Myers, supra note 95, at 354.
100. Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 Texas L. Rev. 1991, 1995 (2007).
101. Wild, supra note 80, at 4.

26

against large entities, and provide additional sources
of capital to individual inventors trying to license their
patents.102 Risch found that 29% of patents enforced
by NPEs were acquired from individual inventors,103
and that they enforced twice as many individual
inventor patents as a random sampling of other litigated
patents.104 Furthermore, he found that because NPEs
are able to pursue high-stakes patent litigation,105 and
because they have greater bargaining power with which
to negotiate settlement deals,106 they are often the
individual inventor’s only viable option for protecting
his rights.
Risch’s study shows that, while NPEs are
active and visible, they operate under the same
parameters as productive entities. Rather than being
freeloaders, rent-seekers, or trolls, they have most
noticeably impacted patent law by providing effective
and affordable enforcement mechanisms to individual
inventors. Accordingly, NPEs have shown that thirdparty enforcement is a viable solution to the problem of
high litigation and enforcement costs.
4.

What can Copyright Law Learn from
Patent NPEs?

NPEs in patent law have most dramatically
benefitted individual inventors via enhanced
enforcement and licensing opportunities.107 In addition,
they provide defense, risk management, and research
and development services to larger clients.108 Of these
services, copyright owners could benefit most from
better enforcement and risk management, and a thirdparty copyright enforcer, or copyright NPE, should
look to patent NPEs for guidance in these areas.
Patent NPEs are able to help individual
inventors protect their works because they are better
situated to use the legal system to enforce their
rights.109 Accordingly, a copyright NPE must be able
to prosecute claims of infringement against even the
most sophisticated infringers, and must have sufficient
bargaining power to negotiate settlement agreements
with large infringers. Ultimately, the copyright
NPE must have a revenue stream that enables it to
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Risch, supra note 21
108. See discussion supra notes 80–81.
109. Risch, supra note 21, at 74. (“NPE litigation may be
the best way for garage inventors to capitalize on their patents if
infringers refuse to license.”).
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aggressively assert its rights.
Furthermore, patent users also benefit from the
risk management services provided by defensive patent
aggregators. With a large pool of patents available for
licensing, the NPE has a reliable revenue source, and
its clients essentially have insurance against the risk of
being sued for infringement. A copyright NPE should
adopt this model with some slight modifications. It
could aggregate a large pool of copyrights, and use the
fees generated by its clients to pursue infringers, rather
than to defend against claims of infringement.
NPEs have been successful in patent law,
and a copyright NPE should seek to emulate their
successes. When looking to patent NPEs for solutions
to the problem of high enforcement costs in copyright
law, a would-be copyright NPE will find that the
benefits of third-party enforcement accrue primarily to
individual actors and small entities, and should target
its efforts accordingly. Just as there are a variety of
NPEs in patent law, the fact that there are also a variety
of content creators in copyright law indicates that a
similar variety of NPEs should exist here as well.

II.
Copyright Law Should Encourage the 		
	Development of NPEs
Copyright law will benefit from NPEs in many
ways that patent law has benefited from NPEs. Just as
patent NPEs provide additional sources of capital to
independent inventors and add credibility to any claims
of infringement,110 copyright NPEs will also benefit
content producers in similar ways. Furthermore, as
there are different business models for patent NPEs, so
too will there be multiple business models for copyright
NPEs.
Depending on its clientele, a copyright NPE
may not be able to effectively operate by owning
copyrights outright. Where producers such as
musicians and dancers operate by both creating and
performing their works, such a system would take too
much control from them and greatly decrease their
ability to profit from their property. Here, the most
efficient method of third-party copyright enforcement
will be through a copyright insurance system. Under
this system, content producers will be able to insure
their works against infringement, and insurance
providers will be able to pursue infringers in the
110. Id.

court system via the doctrine of subrogation. Content
producers will always receive compensation for harm
caused by infringers, and insurance providers will, in
addition to collecting premiums for their services, be
able to use the legal system to pursue infringers.
A.

Copyright Insurance is the Best ThirdParty Enforcement Mechanism

Patent NPEs benefit society primarily by
providing an additional source of capital to independent
inventors, and by providing them with enforcement
services against larger entities that often infringe with
impunity.111 In copyright law, an NPE would provide
these same services, although by different mechanisms.
By providing insurance for copyright infringement,
a copyright NPE would be able to pursue infringers,
while insuring that individual copyright owners are
compensated for their harm.
1.

Copyright Insurance for Content
Creators

A copyright insurance regime is the most
effective mechanism for a copyright NPE to operate
under because it will provide the NPE a steady income
flow while simultaneously giving the owner more
effective and affordable enforcement options. This
insurance would work like most other insurance
plans; a policyholder will pay a premium to insure her
property against harm. Like other forms of insurance,
the insured will determine the value112 of her property,
and insure it for a sum that does not exceed that
amount. When the insured object is damaged, the
policyholder files a claim with the insurance company,
who then compensates her for her loss. In a copyright
insurance policy, the content producer will primarily
insure against infringement,113 and will accordingly file
a claim whenever its work is infringed. It is important
to note, though, that under this system, the insured, not
the insurer, bears the responsibility of discovering and
reporting infringing uses.114
Also, the content producer will always be
compensated for the harm caused by the infringement,
111. See id.
112. A simple Google search for “copyright valuation” yields
a list of several firms that specialize in this service.
113. However, the policy could also be extended to cover
theft, abandonment, etc.
114. The burden of discovering infringing works is not
significant. A Google search for one’s copyrighted property will
often yield many infringing uses. Also, content creators will
normally have networks of colleagues and fans that will notify them
of unauthorized uses.
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up to the amount it has insured against. For example,
if the work was insured for ten-thousand dollars, the
insurance company will pay up to ten-thousand dollars
for any infringement of that work. Accordingly, an
infringement of that work worth five-thousand dollars
will yield five-thousand dollar payment from the
insurer. Conversely, if the infringement caused harm
in excess of ten-thousand dollars, the owner would be
entitled to pursue the infringer for the remainder of the
damage.
Copyright insurance offers security from
infringers while leaving the owner’s copyright intact,
and completely within her control. While the insurance
policy allows the owner to be compensated for her
harm without self-help or the legal system, it does not
destroy her ability to use these mechanisms to enforce
her rights. Although the insurance policy will often be
the cheapest and most effective method for the owner
to receive compensation, it does not obligate her to
forego her other rights.
2.

Copyright Insurance for Insurance
Providers

A copyright insurance provider will operate
by collecting premiums from its policyholders, paying
claims for infringement damages, and then suing
infringers. The insurance provider will have standing
to sue for infringement because once it compensates
a policyholder for its injuries, it will acquire the legal
right to sue the offending party through the doctrine
of subrogation.115 As a legally sophisticated entity, the
insurance provider will be able to use its resources and
expertise to add credibility to its enforcement efforts
in a way that a private individual could not, and in
a way that will deter potential infringers from their
illegal activities. Further, by collecting premiums
from policyholders, the provider will insure that it
has ample resources with which to pursue infringers,
and sufficient funds to compensate instances of
infringement.
First, when a policyholder’s insured property
is infringed, the insurance provider will evaluate
115. In re Hamada, 291 F.3d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In
general terms, subrogation is the substitution of one party in place
of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right. It
is a derivative right, acquired by satisfaction of the loss or claim
that a third party has against another. Subrogation places the party
paying the loss or claim (the “subrogee”) in the shoes of the person
who suffered the loss (“the subrogor”). Thus, when the doctrine of
subrogation applies, the subrogee succeeds to the legal rights and
claims of the subrogor with respect to the loss or claim.”); see also
Mutual Servs. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Elizabeth State Bank, 265 F.3d 601,
629 (7th Cir. 2001).
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the cost of the infringement, and then compensate
the policyholder according to the terms of the
policy. However, before a copyright is insured, it
will be appraised, just like any other piece of insured
property. This will insure that the amount paid by the
provider will reflect the actual damage caused by the
infringement, including damage to value, actual and
potential sales, reputation, and potential licensing deals.
Second, once the insurance provider has fully
compensated the policy owner, it will be free to sue the
infringer to recover the amount it paid to its insured.
Because insurance providers typically have greater
bargaining power than individuals, and because the
insurance provider, and not the content producer, will
bring suit, the infringer will have greater incentive to
settle the case. Just as NPEs in patent law provide
bargaining power and capital to independent inventors,
copyright insurance providers will lend similar
credibility to their clients.
Furthermore, not every instance of
infringement will result in a lawsuit. Often, online
copyright infringement is not worth the cost of a
lawsuit,116 and would be dealt with outside of court.
However, because an infringer would receive a “cease
and desist” letter from an organization rather than an
individual, it would have greater incentive to stop its
infringing behavior. From the provider’s point of view,
a takedown notice, even without a settlement, will be a
valuable tool because it will prevent future infringing
uses, which will in turn lower the number of future
claims it must pay.
Ultimately, the insurance provider, with
the very credible threat of litigation it presents to
infringers, will be able to control infringement more
efficiently than an individual could. Based on the value
of the copyright and the amount of damage caused by
the infringement, the insurance provider would be able
to determine whether to use litigation, negotiation, or a
simple takedown request.
B.

Copyright Insurance is the Best
Solution to Online Infringement, and
the Most Effective Model for an NPE
in Copyright Law

Copyright insurance will solve the problem
of expensive and inaccessible copyright enforcement
116. See, e.g., Danny Bradbury, The Oatmeal beat FunnyJunk,
but other cartoonists aren’t so lucky, Guardian (June 21, 2012, 1:55
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jun/21/oatmealcarreon-comics-property (noting that the highest paid online
cartoonists make about $108 per day. Additionally, litigation can
cost as much as two to three-thousand dollars per day.).
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mechanisms by allowing infringement claims to be
prosecuted by organizations with the means to do so,
and by giving producers an immediate and adequate
remedy. It offers an alternative to the status quo, which
is more efficient, more equitable, and more consistent
with other areas of the law.
1.

Copyright Insurance is More Efficient
than Traditional Enforcement

First, a copyright insurance program will
incentivize the creation of new works by offering
producers more ways to realize value from their
property. By guaranteeing payment for legitimate
injuries, and by allowing sophisticated parties to
prosecute claims of copyright infringement on behalf
of their clients, copyright insurance will reduce
the risk that harm caused by infringement will go
uncompensated. This means that producers will realize
more value from their creations, and will in turn be
motivated to produce more works.
Furthermore, producers will spend less time
trying to protect their works, and more time creating
new works. Just as NPEs in patent law allow inventors
to continue to invent by taking care of the legal issues
associated with the patent, so too will copyright
insurance give producers more resources with which
to create new works. By allowing the producer to
receive immediate compensation for her harm while the
insurance provider addresses the legal issues involved
in the infringement, the producer has more resources
with which to create new works.
Second, insurance companies will reduce
instances of infringement because they, unlike their
clients, have a bargaining position from which they
can negotiate settlements. Because most copyright
infringements are not worth the cost of a trial,117
and because most individuals cannot afford the cost
of litigation,118 private efforts to halt infringement
are often fruitless. However, when a sophisticated
organization with the ability to pursue litigation
attempts to settle an infringement dispute outside of
court, the infringer will more likely stop his illegal
activity than when a private individual sends the same
letter.
Furthermore, because of their greater leverage
and bargaining power, insurance providers will be
able to stop infringement before litigation or even
negotiations become necessary, which will ultimately
lower the cost of enforcement. Because action taken by
117. Id.
118. Id.

an insurance provider will more likely stop offending
activity, it is less likely that the dispute will grow to
a size that will require litigation. Accordingly, every
party involved in the dispute, including the court and
the taxpayers, will benefit from more efficiently settled
conflicts.
Third, copyright insurance will lower
transaction costs in copyright enforcement by
increasing certainty and stability in enforcement
mechanisms. Because content producers will know
that they will be compensated for harm caused by
infringement, they will work less to protect their
property. Rather, the insurance provider, to recover
the value of its payments, will seek compensation from
the infringer. This is a more efficient system because,
as between the insurer and the insured, the insurer
is in the best position to, and can most cheaply seek
redress for the harm. The insurer, because its business
will be enforcing copyrights, will be able to navigate
all aspects of the dispute resolution process more
efficiently and cheaply than could a private individual.
Finally, insurance providers will be better able
to determine which instances of infringement will be
worth litigating than private individuals. Just like
NPEs in patent law, insurance providers will decide
to pursue claims based primarily on the likelihood of
success, and will accordingly litigate only meritorious
claims.119 In contrast, when individuals file suit, their
decisions are often colored by emotion,120 and the
perceived inequities of the situation.121 The result is a
court system burdened by frivolous claims. However,
by preventing meritless and low value claims from
being litigated, insurance providers will decrease the
burden on the courts, and lower the average cost of
litigation across the entire legal landscape.
2.

Copyright Insurance is Consistent
with Related Areas of Law, and
an Appropriate Remedy for Mass
Copyright Infringement

Copyright infringement is an unfortunate
reality of the online world. While no one denies that
such infringement is illegal, the fact remains that no
one has been able to find an effective solution to the
problem.122 However, by encouraging the development
119. See Risch, supra note 21, at 74.
120. Kathryn Abrams, Emotions in the Mobilization of Rights,
46 Harv. C.L.-C.L.L. Rev. 573 (2011).
121. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1135–36 (2000).
122. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 22, at 1.

American University Intellectual Property Brief

29

of copyright insurance, the copyright system would
more accurately reflect the realities of the online world.
Furthermore, by having infringement claims litigated
by third parties, copyright practice would be more
consistent with tort law practice and with the other
subsets of intellectual property law.
First, the copyright system is notorious for its
inability to evolve at the same speed as technology,
and it must constantly be tweaked to prevent it from
becoming entirely obsolete.123 By developing a
copyright insurance system, the law would tacitly
recognize that many content producers cannot afford
to defend their property and that the Internet presents
challenges to copyright law that are too big to be
confronted by individuals. Just as traditional tort
law accepted that many parties who had legitimate
grievances could not afford to seek redress through
the courts, copyright law must recognize that many
copyright owners cannot afford to use the courts to
satisfy their claims. By creating a copyright insurance
system, many owners would receive compensation they
otherwise would not, and the law would be better able
to protect content producers’ intellectual property.
Second, copyright insurance would increase
the cohesion between copyright law and tort law,
while maintaining its conformity to the other subsets
of intellectual property law. By allowing insurance
providers to prosecute infringement for their clients,
injured parties will not have to rely on their own,
often limited, resources to get compensation for their
injuries. Accordingly, copyright law, just like tort
law, will recognize that because insurance companies
depend on litigation for a large part of their business,
and because it is more difficult for individuals to be
productive when they are involved in litigation, it is
more efficient for insurance companies, rather than
individuals, to litigate claims.
Also, copyright insurance will require
copyright owners to maintain and defend their property
to some extent. Because copyright owners will have to
file a claim to be compensated for infringement, they
will have to remain diligent in locating unauthorized
uses of their property. In patent124 and trademark125
law—and even in traditional property law126—owners
are also required to maintain their ownership interest in

their property. This is because the law seeks to reward
productivity and industry, and to hold otherwise would
result in waste, as owners would receive the benefit of
legal protection with no duty in return. In a copyright
insurance system, this requirement will prevent unused
and unwanted intellectual property from being enforced
for illegitimate gain, as logic dictates that few resources
will be used to defend something of little value.

123. Id.
124. The USPTO has a graduated fee structure for maintaining
patents. See http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/
fee031913.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).
125. See, e.g., The Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior
Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101–02 (2d Cir. 1989).
126. See, e.g., O’Keefe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J.
1980).

127. Promoting Investment and Protecting Commerce Online:
Legitimate Sites v. Parasites (Part I & II): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., Competition, and the Internet H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 19 (Mar. 14, 2011) (statement of
Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights).
128. When Righthaven was still filing lawsuits, the Las Vegas
Sun, and blogs such as TechDirt and Ars Technica, provided regular
coverage and commentary on the proceedings.
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3.

Copyright Insurance is More Equitable
than the Current Enforcement
Mechanisms

Copyright insurance will allow content
producers to receive compensation for any instance
of infringement, and will also preserve their ability
to determine when and how they will enforce their
rights. Under the current system, copyright owners
are rarely able to obtain a remedy for their injuries, or
even to enforce their rights at all.127 However, because
copyright insurance will always compensate an owner
for his injury, more owners will recover for their harms,
and, necessarily, more infringers will pay for the harm
they cause. The result is a more equitable copyright
system where more injuries are compensated, and more
defendants are held accountable for their actions.
Furthermore, by requiring a copyright owner to
file a claim in order to receive compensation, the owner
retains complete control over which infringements
will be prosecuted. Because a copyright owner may
not want to sue every infringer, such as people with
disabilities, charitable organizations, or educational
institutions, this requirement provides indirect
protection to such parties, and allows the owner greater
control of how others use his work. In the Righthaven
saga, for example, the media organizations that sold
their rights suffered damage to their reputations when
Righthaven’s aggressive tactics drew the attention of
bloggers and news organizations.128 Here, though, a
copyright owner could avoid such negative associations
by allowing certain instances of infringement, or by
seeking to resolve them privately before filing a claim
with the insurance provider. Regardless of the owner’s
preferred enforcement mechanism, though, the end
result is a dispute resolution system wherein content
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producers have more control in how their rights are
enforced, and where they are more likely to receive
compensation for their harm.
C.

How Will Copyright Insurance Work?

Just as the theoretical underpinnings of
and justifications for copyright insurance are fairly
straightforward, so to is its application to real world
situations. In the introductory section of this Note
involving the Matthew Inman and FunnyJunk,
copyright insurance would have solved the problem
quickly, effectively, and fairly, and it would have
conferred a benefit on each party involved. Mr.
Inman would have received compensation for his
injury, FunnyJunk would have saved the expense of
an attorney, its attorney would have avoided personal
humiliation and unwanted attention, the insurance
company would have received premiums from Mr.
Inman, and taxpayers would have been spared the
expense of federal litigation.
1.

Copyright Insurance and The Oatmeal

When Mr. Inman first noticed that his works
were being infringed, he used self-help in the form
of a DMCA takedown notice to protect his property.
With a simple copyright insurance policy, though,
the dispute would have ended almost before it began.
Mr. Inman could have filed a claim for copyright
infringement rather than attempt to resolve the problem
on his own. He would have been compensated for
the damage caused by the unauthorized posting,
and the insurance company would have approached
FunnyJunk about its infringing activity. Faced with
a demand from the insurance company, FunnyJunk
would have been more diligent in its efforts to remove
the infringing material, as continued violations would
have almost certainly lead to litigation and a settlement
demand. Furthermore, because the owners of other
material on FunnyJunk’s website would likely have
copyright insurance, FunnyJunk would have more
incentive to thoroughly police its site, as each instance
of infringement would be more likely pursued by an
insurance provider.
Because the potential of a lawsuit by an
insurance company would have made FunnyJunk
police its site more diligently, Mr. Inman would not
have felt the need to use public opinion in his fight to
stop the unauthorized use of his work. Accordingly, all
of the charges leveled against Mr. Inman would have
never been filed, and neither party would have born the

expense of attorney’s fees and court costs. Under the
copyright insurance system, then, infringement disputes
would be more likely to be resolved in their early
stages, and the chances of such dramatic escalation
would be greatly reduced.
2.

The Business Model for Copyright
Insurance

Copyright insurance will benefit content
producers, and will allow insurance companies to profit
while doing so. In addition to receiving premiums,
insurance companies will, through subrogation, acquire
the right to sue for infringement on behalf of their
policyholders. With two options for making a profit,
both the insured and insurer will be in a better position
than they would have been without the insurance
policy.
First, insurance companies will charge a
premium that guarantees them a profit. Policyholders
will be able to buy as much or as little insurance as
they need or want, which will affect the amount of the
premium. The insurance company will use the amount
for which the copyright is insured in conjunction
with the likelihood of infringement to calculate the
premium. The resulting payment will allow the
insurance company to compensate the policyholder for
each instance of infringement while still being able to
make a profit.
Once the insurance company pays the
policyholder for its injury, it will acquire the legal
right to seek compensation from the offending party.129
Although this will not always result in litigation, if the
infringement causes significant harm, the insurance
company will be able to fully litigate the claim to
receive the compensation it is entitled to. Because
copyright law will be a primary part of its business,
it will be able to conduct the litigation more cheaply
and more effectively than most. Accordingly, the
insurance company will be in a better position
to settle claims, and will often be able to acquire
adequate compensation without fully trying the case.
Furthermore, even if the case is fully litigated, the
insurance company will have a variety of remedies
to choose from,130 including the option to recover
attorneys’ fees,131 which means it will have a better
chance of recovering its losses through the court.
129. See discussion supra note 115.
130. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–505 (2006) (providing the remedies
for copyright infringement include injunctions, attorney’s fees and
injunction, costs, and damages as well as and profits).
131. Id. § 505.
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Copyright insurance is pragmatic both in
theory and in its application. It provides content
producers with an effective tool to fight copyright
infringement, as well as a method through which
to receive adequate compensation. Copyright
insurance also enables insurance companies to provide
remedies to injured creators while still generating
profits. Furthermore, its accompanying economic
incentives will encourage insurance companies to avail
themselves of the court system only to pursue the worst
offenders. The result will be a simple system that
efficiently and comprehensively solves the problem of
online copyright infringement.
III.

Criticisms of Copyright Insurance

Copyright insurance provides an effective,
efficient, and affordable solution to mass copyright
infringement. Granted, critics of this concept
argue that the fair use doctrine will make copyright
insurance ineffective, that insurance providers will
coerce settlement agreements, and that the owners
will profit at the content providers’ expense. Each
criticism addresses a legitimate area of concern. Still,
while copyright insurance may have various negative
consequences, the probability that they will occur is
remote. Even so, the benefit that will accrue to society
under this program outweighs the criticisms presented.
A.

The Fair Use Doctrine Will Not Render
Copyright Insurance Ineffective

An argument that opponents could make is
that the fair use doctrine renders it too difficult for
insurance companies to predict copyright infringement
and insure the content providers yet remain profitable
organizations. The fair use doctrine is an affirmative
defense against a claim of copyright infringement.132
For example, if charged with copyright infringement,
a defendant may claim that, although he did use the
work, his use was a “fair use” and, therefore, not an
infringement. Doing so would constitute an absolute
defense against copyright infringement claims.133 One
could argue that this, in turn, could render the program
unprofitable and thus ineffective.
Although this argument demonstrates a
valid flaw within the copyright insurance system, it
is unlikely that this deficiency presents a significant
132. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright
Fair Use Option, 1978-2005, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 549 (2008);
see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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handicap to the program. Firstly, disputes between
providers and policyholders over whether an infringing
use is a fair use will be rare. Secondly, fair use will not
make copyright insurance unpredictable to the point
of unprofitability. Thirdly, while fair use is considered
a broad and vague area of copyright law, courts have
already consistently applied this doctrine, enabling
insurance companies to make informed decisions as
to fair use. Lastly, the perceived vagueness of fair
use does not display enough risk factors to discourage
insurance providers from entering the copy right
insurance business.
To begin with, insurance providers are
generally required by law to provide an explanation
of the denial of a claim.134 A disgruntled policyholder
would be able to provide outside counsel with the
provider’s opinion of why the use was fair. If the
policyholder’s attorney agreed with the assessment of
the fair use claim, the dispute would most likely be
dropped. Alternatively, if the provider’s explanation
were deemed unacceptable, the policyholder would
still have a right to pursue the infringer independent
of the insurer, and, depending on the jurisdiction,
may have the option to seek tort,135 contract,136 or
statutory137 remedies against the provider for denying
the claim in bad faith. The provider’s potential liability
is an incentive for it to handle claims fairly. The
policyholder’s ability to sue after his claim is denied
also prevents insurance providers from exercising too
much power over copyright litigation, and demonstrates
that the copyright insurance program is feasible.
Additionally, insurance providers regularly
insure businesses against claims of copyright
infringement as part of standard commercial general
liability policy.138 Accordingly, there exists a
134. See, e.g., 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/154.6(n). (“Any of
the following acts by a company . . . constitutes an improper claims
practice . . . . Failing in the case of the denial of a claim or the
offer of a compromise settlement to promptly provide a reasonable
and accurate explanation of the basis in the insurance policy or
applicable law for such denial or compromise settlement.”).
135. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp.
432, 435 (D. Colo. 1990) (citing Williams v. Farmers Insurance
Group, Inc., 781 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1989)); see also id. (holding
that the state’s insurance law did not preclude a common law action
for bad faith claim denial).
136. See, e.g., Chamberlaine & Flowers, Inc. v. Smith
Contracting, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 414, 417 (W. Va. 1986) (holding
that failure to pay an insurance claim is nonfeasance, rather than
misfeasance, and therefore a contractual claim).
137. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 375.420 (2012); 40 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 1171.5(10) (2012).
138. The standard form commercial general liability policy,
as provided by the Insurance Services Office, extends coverage for
advertising injuries, which it defines as an “injury arising out of an
offense committed during the policy period occurring in the course
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significant body of relevant history and applicable
case law.139 Using this data insurance companies
could determine the likelihood of a given work being
infringed, and furthermore the likelihood of that
use being a fair use. Incidentally, Professor Barton
Beebe published an empirical study of fair use
litigation in which he detailed the win rates of fair
use defendants.140 Insurance providers, as statisticgenerating machines, should be capable of distilling
the same elements Professor Beebe studied and
reformulating them to fit their needs. This would
allow the companies to profitably predict fair use and
reinforce the effectiveness of the copyright insurance
program.
Furthermore, despite the perception that
the fair use doctrine is part of a broad and vague
area of copyright law,141 courts have already applied
this doctrine with consistency.142 The doctrine is
uniformly applied to an extent that most judges
discuss it formulaically and rather mechanically.143
Accordingly, insurance providers could incorporate
this data into their models that determine where to set
their premiums. Because they could make case-bycase judgments of whether a use is fair, this insurance
program will work.
Finally, insurance providers would not be
dissuaded from entering a copyright insurance market
as they regularly insure products whose level of risk
is difficult to predict on a case-by-case basis.144 For
example, individuals regularly insure their cars against
accidents, and their homes against floods, fires, and
tornados. At an individual level, the contingency
insured against is extremely difficult to predict. In
contrast, by pooling145 clients and evaluating the risk
in a large sample of individuals, the insurance provider
is able to predict the average rate of risk. In copyright
of the named insured’s advertising activities, if the injury arises out
of libel, slander, defamation, violation of right of privacy, piracy,
unfair competition or infringement of copyright, title or slogan.”
139. See, e.g., Euroconcepts, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.,
378 F. App’x 716 (9th Cir. 2011); Delta Computer Corp. v. Frank,
196 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 1999).
140. Beebe, supra note 132.
141. See R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual
Property and Public Values, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 423, 431 (2005).
142. Beebe, supra note 132, at 584 (noting that the outcomes
of the first and fourth elements of the fair use test correspond with
the outcome of the case 81.5% and 83.8% of the time, respectively).
143. Id. at 561.
144. Statistics, NAIC, http://www.naic.org/cipr_statistics.htm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
145. Pooling refers to the practice of assessing the risk within
a large group of products. By determining the rate at which the
contingency will occur within the group, the insurance provider is
able set its premiums at a level that will guarantee profitability.

insurance, this translates to insurance providers
establishing a rate at which its clients will win or lose
fair use arguments, and to the notion that an insurance
program is feasible.
Because there is data to show the probability
of a successful fair use defense,146 insurance providers
could calculate the amount of risk inherent in copyright
insurance and will be able to plan accordingly.
B.

Copyright Insurance Providers Will
Not Bully Fair Users Into Settlement
Agreements

Another criticism of copyright insurance is
that insurance providers will adopt the trollish tactics
of Righthaven by bullying ill-equipped parties into
costly settlement agreements. Because the law does
not prevent copyright owners from using aggressive
tactics to protect their works, opponents of copyright
insurance will argue that insurance providers will
use their size and sophistication to unfairly negotiate
settlement payments. The insurance providers, in
contrast to Righthaven, would have legal standing to
sue,147 and as a result the threat of a lawsuit would be
much more potent.
First, copyright insurers are not likely to seek
improper settlement agreements from legitimate users
because they will only be able to pursue the claims
that they have honored. As the insurance company
will have to pay its policyholder before it can acquire
the right to sue,148 it will be incentivized to only
pursue cases from which it can profit. Accordingly,
an insurance provider will not pursue infringers unless
those infringers will be able to pay an amount that is
greater than the cost of both the claim and the resources
spent on the settlement or litigation efforts.
The reason Righthaven pursued so many
questionable claims is that it usually only had to pay
the cost of demanding and negotiating the settlement.149
If a defendant with a meritorious defense did not
acquiesce, Righthaven could always dismiss the case
and cut its losses.150 Because it did not have to invest
146. Beebe, supra note 132.
147. See discussion supra note 115.
148. Id.
149. In many cases, Righthaven simply had to pay the sixtyfive dollar fee to register its copyright in the infringed work, send a
standard cease-and-desist letter to the infringer, and then negotiate
a settlement. See Steve Green, Attorneys Accuse Righthaven of
Settlement Shakedown, Las Vegas Sun (Oct. 8, 2010, 1:50 AM),
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/ 2010/oct/08/attorneys-accuserighthaven-settlement-shakedown.
150. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) (allowing a plaintiff to
voluntarily dismiss an action). Righthaven did this twenty-nine
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significant resources into pursuing an infringer, like an
insurance provider will have to do via payment of the
claim, Righthaven was able to shake down potential
infringers with little regard for the consequences of
its acts.151 If it had been required to compensate its
clients before it could pursue infringers, it is likely that
Righthaven would have only sued users that caused
legitimate harm.
Second, copyright insurance providers will not
adopt trollish tactics because they will want to maintain
a good reputation with their clients and potential
customers. As business entities, insurance providers
will compete with each other for market share.152 In
addition to providing quality services, they will also
have to gain and keep the trust of their customers.
Judging by the almost universal hatred with which the
judiciary and the general public view Righthaven,153
few insurance providers, if any, will be willing to
embark on a similar path.
Third, as between the content producer and
the content infringer, it is better for society that the law
favors the producer. The content producer invests her
time, money, and creative energy into bringing new
works into existence. Conversely, the infringer merely
redistributes the work of others for his own personal
gain. While high litigation costs deter the producer
from protecting her intellectual property, they should
be used instead to deter infringers from stealing others’
creative output.
C.

Copyright Insurance Will Not Unfairly
Benefit Insurance Providers and
Content Producers at the Expense of
Fair Users and Free Speech

Finally, opponents of copyright insurance argue
times during its filing stint. Most of the voluntary dismissals
occurred in the last months of 2011. For the complete list, see
Comprehensive List of Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Filed By
Righthaven, LLC, Righthaven Lawsuits, http://righthavenlawsuits.
com/ lawsuits.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2013).
151. For example, Righthaven unknowingly sued an autistic
blogger on a fixed income in early 2011. See Righthaven, LLC v.
Hill, No. 1:11-CV-00211 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 2011).
152. Auto Insurance, Ins. Info. Inst., http://www.iii.org/
facts_statistics/auto-insurance.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2013)
(showing that in 2011, the market share controlled by the top ten
private automobile insurers were, with one exception, within two
percentage points of each other. This indicates healthy competition
in the industry).
153. See, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground
LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d. 968, 979 (D. Nev. 2011) (ordering
Righthaven to show cause as to why it should be sanctioned for
“flagrant misrepresentation” to the court). A simple Google search
for “Righthaven” yields a plethora of sites devoted criticizing the
organization.
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that it will improperly benefit insurance providers and
content producers at the expense of infringing fair
users and free speech in general. Because copyright
insurance would give producers more effective ways
to prevent their works from being infringed,154 it
would necessarily increase a copier’s liability for
infringement, and accordingly produce a “chilling
effect” on the exchange of ideas and information. As
copyright exists to increase creative expression, such a
system would run contrary to the fundamental values
of copyright law, and of American jurisprudence in
general.
While this objection raises a legitimate concern
as to the effect of copyright insurance on society as a
whole, it is unlikely to cause significant problems, and,
even if it does, the benefits of the program far outweigh
its costs.
First, it is doubtful that copyright insurance
will have a significant chilling effect on the free
exchange of information. In fact, the law specifically
exempts pure information from copyright protection.155
Rather, only certain forms of expression may be
copyrighted.156 For example, a newspaper article is
protected under copyright law, but the underlying story
cannot be copyrighted.157 Therefore, an insurance
provider will only obtain the enforcement rights to a
particular expression, not to the underlying content.
These rights cannot be used to stifle the legitimate flow
of ideas, only the illegitimate copying of protected
expression.
Second, copyright law incentivizes creativity
by granting producers a limited monopoly over their
works,158 and not by encouraging copiers to infringe
with impunity. Because copiers do not provide
society with anything new, the law does not protect
their activity, and further considers it as offense to
content producers.159 Accordingly, although copyright
insurance will undeniably decrease the amount of free
information available to the public,160 it will only do so
154. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
155. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”) (emphasis
added).
156. Id. § 102(a).
157. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234
(1918) (“In considering the general question of property in news
matter, it is necessary to recognize its dual character, distinguishing
between the substance of the information and the particular form or
collocation of words in which the writer has communicated it.”).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
159. See id. § 501.
160. See supra pp. 5–8.
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with the protected works that would not have been free
but for their infringement.
Third, even if legitimate users of copyrighted
materials are harmed by copyright insurance, the
increased incentive to create new works provided by
insurance will yield a net benefit to society. Currently,
because enforcing copyrights is so expensive,161
unauthorized copiers operate at an advantage over
producers. They can infringe with impunity up to a
certain point, knowing that their actions must cause
a certain amount of harm before they will incite the
owner to action. However, by making copyrights
easier to enforce, copyright insurance will give
producers better footing in their fight against infringers,
and essentially lower the threshold at which infringers
operate. Ultimately, because producers provide new
works and ideas, and infringers merely freeload off of
the producers, society will benefit if the producer is
given more rights.
Conclusion
Mass online copyright infringement remains
a serious problem in the American economy. While
copyright owners have struggled to find effective
enforcement mechanisms, their neighbors in patent
law have found a mechanism by which they can
efficiently protect their rights. In patent law, thirdparty enforcement via non-practicing entities has been
an incredibly successful method for pulling value
from patents, fighting infringement, and providing
additional sources of capital for individual inventors.
Accordingly, to acquire similar benefits, copyright
law should annex the basic principle of third-party
enforcement and transform it into copyright insurance.
By developing a robust copyright insurance
system, copyright owners would benefit from
increased compensation for infringement, more value
in their works, and the services of a sophisticated and
professional organization for litigation. Professional
copyright enforcement would discourage wouldbe infringers from their illegitimate activity, and
thereby increase the profitability of content producers.
Furthermore, copyright insurance is well suited
to existing law, will have a minimum impact on
legitimately fair uses of protected works, and will
encourage, rather than stifle, the creation of new ideas.
Overall, copyright insurance is the most equitable
solution to the problem of mass online copyright
infringement.
161. Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass’n, supra note 37.
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